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Financial dollarisation is a key characteristic to consider when designing and implementing policies in 
Peru. This is because it has some inherent risks for the economy. For example, an unexpected sharp 
domestic currency depreciation may have negative consequences on the economy through the 
well-known balance sheet effect. 
In order to reduce financial dollarisation risks, there are some policy responses that can be 
implemented. One of them is to moderate excessive exchange rate volatility. The Central Bank of Peru 
(BCR) intervenes in the foreign exchange market to moderate excessive exchange rate volatility, with 
no target concerning its level. Therefore, these are leaning against the wind interventions.  
This paper reviews forex interventions in Peru under inflation targeting (2002-04). The motives for 
foreign exchange interventions are explained in section 1. The most recent periods of significant forex 
interventions in Peru are described in section 2. Section 3 outlines the effectiveness of BCR 
interventions in the foreign exchange market. Finally, some concluding remarks are stated in 
section 4. 
1. Motives 
The BCR has an inflation targeting (IT) framework for monetary policy. Consistent with this scheme 
and with free capital mobility in the economy, the exchange rate needs to be flexible in order for the 
BCR to be able to implement an independent monetary policy that aims at attaining its inflation target 
(2.5 percent, with a maximum tolerated deviation of one percentage point above and below the target). 
However, policies must take into consideration the high degree of financial dollarisation, both to control 
its inherent risks and to promote the role of the domestic currency as store of value.  Although financial 
dollarisation has been steadily decreasing in the last few years, the degree is still high. By the end of 
2004, 55 percent of broad money and more than 70 percent of credit to the private sector were 
denominated in foreign currency. 
Financial dollarisation causes two types of mismatches in the balance sheet of economic agents 
(Baliño et al (1999)): maturity and currency mismatches. Regarding the latter mismatch, it causes the 
private non-financial sector to face an exchange rate risk. This is because its income is basically 
denominated in domestic currency, while it has debts in foreign currency. Thus, an unexpected large 
domestic currency depreciation may trigger the alarm on the solvency of the private non-financial 
sector, thereby increasing the financial sector’s credit risk. 
The financial sector, on the other hand, has a maturity mismatch that is related to the fact that it has 
short term liabilities in foreign currency, while its assets in the same currency have a larger average 
maturity. Although this type of liquidity risk is common to banking systems, the risk in a financially 
dollarised economy is higher because the central bank does not issue foreign currency. 
Certain policies have been implemented to deal with financial dollarisation risks in the Peruvian case 
(BCR (2003)). They aim at reducing it or at assuring the availability of liquid funds in a contingent 
financial sector foreign currency liquidity crisis. 
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Table 1 
Financial dollarisation indicators 
As a percentage of total monetary aggregate 
Year  Banking system 
broad money 
Banking system credit 
to the private sector 
Financial system credit 
to the private sector 
1993 69  76  77 
1994 64  74  74 
1995 63  71  72 
1996 67  74  72 
1997 65  77  75 
1998 69  80  79 
1999 70  82  82 
2000 70  82  81 
2001 67  80  78 
2002 65  79  76 
2003 62  77  73 
2004 55  74  71 
 
One of these measures is to have a high level of international reserves. A high level of international 
reserves is a buffer stock for supporting the financial system whenever a bank run on a foreign 
currency-denominated liability occurs. It is also necessary for carrying out eventual forex interventions 
when there is an unexpected sharp domestic currency depreciation episode. 
 
Table 2 
Financial dollarisation risks  Policy responses 
Liquidity risk (maturity mismatch)  High level of international reserves 
Exchange rate risk (currency mismatch)  High reserve requirements on commercial bank 
foreign currency liabilities 
  Central bank moderates excessive exchange rate 
volatility 
  Inflation targeting framework 
  Capital market development in domestic currency 
 
A criticism to keeping a high level of international reserves is the moral hazard that is present in every 
insurance. Given that there is a high probability that the central bank would use the international 
reserves to provide liquidity in the “bad state of nature”, the financial system may fail to internalise 
dollarisation risks. In Peru, the financial system has a high reserve requirement on foreign currency 
liabilities (about 30 percent), which reduces this perverse incentive. 
These deposits are part of BCR net international reserves. Approximately half of net foreign exchange 
reserves are borrowed, in the sense that this part of international reserves corresponds to central bank 
foreign currency domestic liabilities: 27 percent are commercial banks’ foreign currency deposits at the 
BCR (mainly as part of reserve requirements), while 22 percent are government deposits. This 
proportion of borrowed reserves has been declining over the last two years, given that the central bank 
has been purchasing foreign currency in the market in 2003 and 2004 to smooth the appreciating 
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Net international reserves 










Other mechanisms to reduce financial dollarisation risks are the implementation of an inflation 
targeting framework for monetary policy and the development of the local capital market in domestic 
currency. 
Finally, the BCR has the policy of moderating excessive exchange rate volatility. Forex interventions 
lean against the wind, with no target concerning the exchange rate level. This smoothing goal relates 
to the rate of change of the exchange rate, as measured in a low frequency. The empirical evidence 
shows that the BCR does not change the sign of interventions (from buying to selling, or vice versa) 
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There is no commitment to a fixed or stable exchange rate because that would be inconsistent with the 
IT framework. Moreover, it would probably lead to a moral hazard problem: economic agents may fail 
to internalise the inherent currency risk of financial dollarisation if they perceive that the central bank is 
providing them with an implicit foreign exchange insurance through forex interventions targeting an 
exchange rate level. 
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In addition, Ize and Levy-Yeyati (1998) presented a portfolio model of financial intermediation in which 
currency choice is determined by hedging decisions on both sides of a bank’s balance sheet. 
Dollarisation hysteresis is shown to occur when the expected volatility of the inflation rate is high in 
relation to that of the real exchange rate. 
In this way, although excessive exchange rate movements are risky in a financially dollarised economy 
(balance sheet effect), it is also convenient to let the exchange rate float because that is an incentive 
for economic agents to dedollarise. In turn, lower dollarisation reduces the risks of higher exchange 
rate variability. 
BCR foreign currency sales have been useful to show markets that foreign currency would be 
provided if necessary, especially in an episode of financial turmoil, like the one in September 2002. 
They counteract any overreaction and smooth the path of the exchange rate. 
Foreign currency purchases, on the other hand, have also allowed the increase of net international 
reserves (NIR) from US$ 9.6 billion in December 2002 to US$ 12.3 billion in November 2004. 
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The high level of international reserves has had some positive impact on credit ratings by reducing the 
probability of a domestic financial crisis, acting as an “insurance” against the latter. The higher the 
insurance, the safer the country seems. The importance of this is greater when considering the 
expected increase in US interest rates, which in the past have caused significant capital outflows in 
Latin American economies. 
This precautionary policy of accumulating international reserves looks forward to a period of increasing 
interest rates in foreign markets (2004-06) and to the upcoming domestic general elections (first 
semester of 2006). A high net international reserves balance reduces the risks of increased 
uncertainty that usually come along with general election periods, particularly in emerging markets. 
This NIR accumulation has allowed the improvement of international liquidity indicators, such as the 
ratio of coverage of short term external liabilities and broad money, in the last two years. 
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Table 3 
International liqudity indicators 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
NIR/short term liabilities  1.5 times  1.7 times  2.2 times  2.2 times  2.3 times 
NIR/imports of goods and services  13 months  14 months  16 months 15  months 15  months 
NIR/banking system broad money  61%  61%  65%  67%  69% 
 
2.  Forex interventions in 2002 and 2003-2004 
The increased uncertainty over the election process in Brazil and the higher risk aversion of 
international investors due to default events in the U.S. capital market boosted Peru’s country risk 
during the second and third quarters of 2002, as the following graph shows. This caused a rise in 
domestic currency depreciation expectations, encouraging the demand for foreign currency hedging 
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The rise in the demand for foreign currency hedging assets showed up in the relatively new forex 
forward market, developed by commercial banks in the mid 90s. In periods of higher exchange rate 
volatility, as in 1998-99 (Russian and Brazilian crises), 2002 (uncertainty over political elections in 
Brazil), and 2004 (significant terms of trade increase), the average outstanding stock of forex forward 
contracts has been larger. BIS Papers No 24  247
 
Table 4 
Forex forward market 
Average outstanding stocks, in US$ million 




1998 267  779  1047  12.5 
1999 149  548  696  7.2 
2000 192  648  841  2.8 
2001 398  929  1326  4.8 
2002 317  1151  1468  6.6 
2003 222  937  1159  0.9 




The Peruvian forex forward market is asymmetric. Forward sales of foreign currency are far greater 
than forward purchases. This may reduce the scope of using this market for hedging purposes in 
periods where there is a strong pressure for the domestic currency to depreciate. When there is a 
drastic increase in domestic currency depreciation expectations, commercial banks sell forex forwards 
and buy foreign currency in the spot market in order to hedge the former operation, which causes the 
exchange rate to rise. This can be noticed in the following graph: the forex forward net sales position 
began to increase in the third quarter of 2002, and the exchange rate followed the same pattern; when 
it decreased in the fourth quarter of the same year, the exchange rate followed shortly after. 
 
















































Exchange rate Commercial banks' forex forward net sales position
Increased uncertainty related to the 
Brazilian presidential election
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Between May and September, Peruvian sol/US$ exchange rate fluctuations were closely related to 
those of the Brazilian real/US$. In this period, the Peruvian domestic currency depreciated 
5.8 percent, even though there were no macro fundamental reasons for this to happen. 
The central bank intervened in the foreign exchange market to counteract the overreaction and 
smooth the path of the exchange rate. At the same time, the central bank transitorily increased the 
policy interest rate in order to moderate the sharp exchange rate variability by increasing the cost of 
domestic currency funds that were being used to buy foreign currency. 
The interbank interest rate increased from 2.6 percent in June to 2.9 percent in August, and to 
5.4 percent in September. 
 
 
Interbank, benchmark (ceiling), and 
overnight deposits (floor) interest rates 
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On the other hand, the higher foreign currency assets demand was matched with forex sales that 
added up to US$ 127 million during September. In addition, between the end of August and 
mid-October, the central bank sold approximately US$ 90 million in CDR. These CDR are securities 
denominated in domestic currency, but adjusted for foreign currency price movements. Thus, they 
were aimed at providing the market with a hedging asset and, in this way, lowering the pressure on the 
exchange rate. This market instrument is also used in Brazil and Chile. The amount of CDR issued 
between July and October 2002 was relatively low (0.16 percent of 2002 nominal GDP and 
0.3 percent of the average daily turnover in the forex market). Since 2003 there have been no CDR in 
the market. BIS Papers No 24  249
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These measures allowed the exchange rate to smooth its upward trend. The Peruvian sol depreciated 
1.7 percent against the US dollar in August and 0.8 percent in September. In October, uncertainty over 
the Brazilian presidential election fell and the Peruvian economy began to be differentiated from the 
other economies in the region thanks to its better macro fundamentals (GDP growing at rates of more 
than 4 percent, inflation below 2 percent, and fiscal deficit continuously reducing). These made 
possible the reduction of depreciation expectations, so that the interbank interest rate declined to 
4.6 percent in October, while the exchange rate decreased 1.2 percent in October and 2.6 percent in 
November. The benchmark standing facilities interest rate was then reduced from 4.75 percent in 
October and November to 4.5 percent in December. 
 




























1  An increase means that the domestic currency depreciates. 250  BIS Papers No 24
 
Since 2003 there has been a domestic currency appreciation trend. Peru is not alone in this process: 
all other major currencies in the Latin American region are facing the same process. The reasons are 
related to the weakness of the US dollar in international markets and to positive results in the Peruvian 
external sector. 
Nominal exchange rate and BCR monthly 






































During this domestic currency appreciation period, forex interventions have mainly taken place when 
appreciation pressures on the domestic currency significantly increased due to portfolio movements 
from foreign to local currency, aiming at smoothing the exchange rate fall.  
Since the beginning of 2003, the BCR has purchased around US$ 3.1 billion (as of 30 November 2004) 
in the foreign exchange market. This has allowed the strengthening of the BCR’s international 
reserves position and made it possible to accommodate portfolio movements in a context of steady 
financial dedollarisation. 
Forex interventions have also allowed the BCR to accumulate US$ 2.7 billion in net international 
reserves, relative to December 2002. Thus, the stock of NIR reached a balance of almost US$ 12.3 billion 
in November 2004, the highest ever recorded. It is an important buffer stock against any disruption in 
the economy, considering that, for instance, it is more than twice the stock of the due-in-one-year 
external debt (debt in foreign currency with non-residents). 
These forex interventions have been sterilised. The central bank uses the daily interbank interest rate 
as operational target for controlling monetary conditions. Banking reserves demand that is consistent 
with the operational target is satisfied via repo operations or issuing BCR securities (CDBCRP). In this 
way, daily monetary operations aim at keeping the interbank interest rate at the level set by the central 
bank (policy target level). 
However, forex purchases may imply that supplied banking reserves are greater than reserves 
demand. This would cause a downward pressure on the interbank interest rate. Therefore, foreign 
exchange interventions in 2003-04 have had to be sterilised with CDBCRP in order to avoid the 
deviation of the interbank interest rate from the policy target level. The stock of CDBCRP has 
increased from S/ 2.0 billion (1.0 percent of 2002 nominal GDP) to S/ 8.3 billion (3.5 percent of 2004 
nominal GDP) between the end of 2002 and the end of 2004. BIS Papers No 24  251
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These securities are issued with maturities ranging from one week to three years. In November 2004, 
for example, the average interest rate for 3-months-maturity CDBCRPs issued in that month was 































1  Numbers inside brackets are spreads relative to the interbank interest rate.
CDBCRP yield curve
1  
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A risk related to sterilised forex purchases is that the interest rate on the securities used to sterilise is 
higher than that the central bank receives from its foreign exchange investments. 
The central bank has the authority to determine the exchange rate regime, to conduct the exchange 
rate policy, and to decide on interventions in the foreign exchange market. In this sense, any cost due 
to the intervention is solely of the central bank, with no cost being allocated to the government. 
However, if the BCR’s net worth turns out below legal capital, the Charter Law calls for the Treasury to 
issue bonds in favour of the central bank. 
3.  Effectiveness of forex interventions 
Although financial dollarisation increases the vulnerability of the economy to depreciation-induced 
balance sheet problems, it seems to have made forex interventions less difficult. Given this high 
financial dollarisation, the amount of domestic currency in the economy is smaller than it would 
otherwise be. Therefore, it is less difficult for the BCR to influence the exchange rate with a relatively 
small intervention. 
The estimates for the average daily turnover in the foreign exchange market decreased from 
US$ 297 million in May 2002 to US$ 261 million in May 2003 and to US$ 216 million in May 2004. 
Although forex interventions have been relatively frequent since the beginning of 2003 (the BCR has 
conducted foreign exchange interventions on approximately 47 percent of business days between 
January 2003 and September 2004), the average size of foreign exchange interventions has been 
relatively small (US$ 7.1 million as of September 2004) relative to the average daily turnover in the 
forex market. 
In addition, it is possible for the BCR to estimate supply or demand pressures on the forex spot 
market, and thus forex volatility arising from portfolio currency movements can be readily identified. If 
an intervention is necessary, it is made in the wholesale spot market (operations are done just with 
commercial banks). The BCR does not intervene in the forex forward or swap markets. 
These forex interventions are not pre-announced. However, ex-post, data on forex interventions are 
available at the end of the day on which the intervention has taken place. These data can be found on 
the BCR’s website (www.bcrp.gob.pe). There is information on the amount of the intervention and on 
the exchange rate of the forex operation. Moreover, a general statement on reasons behind any 
eventual FX intervention decision is published in the Inflation Report issue that immediately follows the 
operation. 
Usually, when the BCR intervenes in the forex market, the media put special emphasis on the amount 
of the intervention. This seems to be the most relevant information, and is like a signal of the “strength 
of the decision” to smooth the path of the exchange rate. Thus, it seems that the central bank 
influences the exchange rate basically through the expectations channel (particularly the expectations 
about future interventions). 
In this sense, the BCR “wants to be seen” when it intervenes. The intervention gives the signal that 
there is excessive exchange rate volatility in the market and that the BCR is going to take the 
appropriate measures to calm it down. This does not mean, however, that the central bank plays the 
role of a market maker in the foreign exchange market. 
In the case of the portfolio balance channel, the intervention is most likely to be effective when there 
are anticipated and one-time portfolio currency movements. Otherwise, the effectiveness of the 
intervention through this channel is low. 
Internal studies on the effectiveness of official forex interventions provide empirical evidence that 
central bank foreign exchange interventions have been effective in reducing exchange rate volatility. 
According to Flores (2003) and Azañero (2003), forex selling interventions have been effective around 
two thirds of the time, while forex buying interventions have been a little bit more effective than that. 
Thus, BCR foreign exchange interventions have been effective most of the time in achieving their main 
goal, that is, to calm disorderly markets by reducing excessive exchange rate volatility, without any 
significant difference in effectiveness when the exchange rate is appreciating or depreciating. 
Based on more recent empirical evidence, it may be added that when there have been appreciation 
pressures on the domestic currency, and forex purchases have been continuous, the effect of the BIS Papers No 24  253
 
interventions on the exchange rate seems to have diminished. The explanation to this evidence may 
be related to the fundamentals that are forcing the appreciation of the Peruvian sol. In this context, 
forex interventions have tried to smooth - but not stop - the downward trend of the exchange rate in 
2003-04. On a shorter horizon (eg October-November 2004), the leaning against the wind goal has 
been fulfilled. 
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4. Concluding  remarks 
The inflation targeting framework for monetary policy needs the exchange rate to be flexible. However, 
the design and implementation of policies need to take into consideration that unexpected large 
domestic currency depreciations are currently too risky for the economy to be tolerated. The reason 
stems from the fact that there is a high financial dollarisation. Thus, there is a need to smooth the path 
of the exchange rate. 
Forex interventions in 2002 and 2003-04 have succeeded in smoothing the exchange rate path. 
Additionally, international reserves have increased, which in itself has a positive impact on the 
reduction of the probability of a domestic financial crisis. 
The central bank exchange rate smoothing policy does not aim at keeping a stable exchange rate. If it 
did, economic agents might perceive that the exchange rate policy supports a stable price for the 
foreign currency, and this could be taken as an insurance against forex risk from investing in foreign 
currency assets. This risk insurance would favour financial dollarisation. 
In order to keep the interbank interest rate at the policy target level, the central bank needs to sterilise 
forex purchases. These sterilisation operations imply some costs, which the BCR has had to manage. 
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